




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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



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NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

SECRET
NSC-U/DM-137

January 19, 1976

TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of Commerce
The Under Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare
The Under Secretary of Transportation
The Special Trade Representative
The Chairman, Council on Environmental
Quality
The Administrator, Environmental
Protection Agency
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Director, United States Information
Agency
The Acting Executive Director, Council on
International Economic Policy

SUBJECT: First Quarterly Report on Implementation of
the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

The Chairman has forwarded the attached Memorandum
to the President. A copy is provided for your
information.

Wreatham E. Gathright
Wreatham E. Gathright
Staff Director

Attachment:

As stated

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Dist.made in
accordance with
NSC-U/DM-137

NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

SECRET
NSC-U/DM-137

January 15, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: First Quarterly Report on Implementation
of the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

This is the first report on implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to be submitted by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee in response to your directive. In accordance with that directive, this report covers all aspects of implementation of the Final Act, but devotes special attention to implementation by the Communist states and to the background of existing East-West activity against which CSCE is to be implemented.

In order to provide an adequate basis for comparison with subsequent progress on subjects covered by the CSCE, we have attempted in this first report to relate relevant CSCE provisions to important existing activities in the same fields. More detailed information is provided in cases where significant action has already resulted directly from the provisions of the Final Act.

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The enclosed report is organized in two parts. The first is a general discussion of actions related to each section of the Final Act. The second is an Annex with details on the status of CSCE implementation in the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states; this Annex is based on a checklist which has been provided to all of our embassies in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact member states for the purpose of establishing a standard basis for monitoring implementation. The nominal period covered by this initial report is August 1 to October 31, 1975.

It should be noted that the Final Act of the CSCE is neither a treaty nor an agreement, and is therefore not legally binding on the signatories. Nevertheless, signature at the highest level constitutes a strong moral and political obligation to implement the provisions of the Final Act. These provisions generally establish goals and standards of performance in the fields covered by the Final Act. The extent of their implementation will inevitably vary from country to country, in the West as well as in the East.

The period since the signing of the Final Act on August 1, 1975 has been one of interpretation, review, and organization. Governments have sought to adjust to the post-Helsinki situation, to restate national views of the conference, to organize for the implementation period, and to undertake initial contacts and exchanges of view on the concept of implementation. In addition, there have been a number of specific initiatives resulting from CSCE provisions.

All participant countries have been seeking to define the significance of the post-Helsinki situation and this effort has been manifested in speeches, public statements and articles in both East and West. This has entailed reiteration of differing national interpretations, with the Communist states emphasizing the importance of the list of CSCE principles, especially the principles

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of inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in internal affairs. Western comments have concentrated on the objective of freer movement of people and ideas and the need for implementation of commitments made under the CSCE in this field.

The US has sought to impress upon the states participating in CSCE its interest in full implementation. To organize allied countries for implementation, the US took the initiative in NATO to coordinate actions related to Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and, through a systematic exchange of information, to monitor Warsaw Pact implementation of CBMs and in other CSCE areas. This effort has been successful, and a system has been established providing for semi-annual implementation reports in NATO. The nine members of the European Community (eight of whom belong to NATO) have established a similar arrangement, and most other Western governments with whom we have consulted have taken national measures of some kind to deal with implementation matters.

The US has begun a series of bilateral demarches with the Soviet Union and other Communist states to encourage implementation of CSCE provisions of particular interest to the U.S., based on conditions in the countries concerned. Although initial verbal reactions to these contacts have been positive in general terms, and there has been some progress on a few specific provisions, we continue to await concrete action in most subject areas.

We have also been in contact with neutral CSCE participants to stress our interest in implementation and to offer to exchange information on post-CSCE developments leading to the CSCE follow-up meetings scheduled for 1977 in Belgrade. In the multilateral field, efforts are underway to identify activities for action in the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and UNESCO, which are specifically cited in the Final Act.

Specific steps which have been taken as a result of CSCE provisions include the publication of the

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CSCE Final Act in full in the national press of the Soviet Union and other Communist states, as well as in the US and Western states, the advance notification of six military maneuvers by the US and its NATO allies and one each by Yugoslavia and Switzerland, and the invitation by the FRG for CSCE participants to send observers to the NATO exercise Certain Trek (an invitation not accepted by the East). The Warsaw Pact countries did not notify any maneuvers to other CSCE states during the period of this report, although on January 4, 1976, the Soviet Union gave notification of a maneuver called "Caucasus" involving about 25,000 men to take place near the Turkish border from January 25 - February 6. The U.S. and the USSR have also agreed, by an exchange of notes, to issue multiple entry/exit visas to resident journalists of the other country, and several divided families of interest to us have been reunited following the annual presentation of the U.S. representation list to the Soviets, at which time the U.S. cited CSCE provisions on family reunification. Finally, we have raised in the CSCE context various subjects, mostly related to human contacts and information, with the communist governments.


It is too early to assess definitive Soviet intentions in the implementation of the Final Act, particularly the provisions on human contacts and information. The Soviets will be most reluctant to implement certain of the CSCE provisions under any circumstances and will probably proceed only with great deliberation to implement CSCE provisions which they consider potentially harmful to their basic interests. In addition the Soviet bureaucracy is notoriously slow in coming to grips with new issues, and the Soviets may have been initially unprepared for our rapid steps to implement the CSCE provisions after the Helsinki Summit. For example, when we approached them on the question of multiple entry/exit visas for American journalists, they seemed unsure of how to proceed on the matter; it was only after several exchanges that the issue was resolved.

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We are only at the beginning of this process, but important questions will arise if the Soviets do not make satisfactory progress in CSCE areas such as human contacts and information, which are of special interest to the West, prior to the CSCE follow-up meetings in Belgrade in 1977. In these circumstances, public and parliamentary opinion in the U.S. and elsewhere in the West may well become even more skeptical regarding the value of the detente process in general and the CSCE in particular.



Robert S. Ingersoll
Chairman

Attachment:
CSCE Report

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